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JURISDICTION 
Respondent/Third-party defendant, The Manufacturers Life 
Insurance Company (herein "Manulife"), disputes jurisdiction. 
The appellant filed its Notice of Appeal on June 10, 1988. By 
its terms, the Notice applies to judgments entered May 12, 1988, 
and May 26, 1988, in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence 
claims and in favor of third-party defendant Manulife. Claims 
were still pending in the Court below, however, on plaintiffs' 
contract claims. Nor did the Court certify the judgment or 
order as to Manulife as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the appellant's Notice of 
Appeal was from a non-final judgment or order and was techni-
cally insufficient to provide jurisdiction as to Manulife. 
Subsequently, the Court below disposed of all claims and 
all parties by granting summary judgment on plaintiffs' 
contract claims in the fall of 1988. Counsel points out that 
under these circumstances and in keeping with the policy that 
practical, not technical, considerations are to govern the 
application of principles of finality, courts in many juris-
dictions hold that the Court's subsequent order validates the 
otherwise premature notice. See e.g. Annot., Premature Notice 
of Appeal, 76 ALR Fed. 199 § 4. Nevertheless, counsel has 
discovered no Utah cases precisely on point. Utah law is clear 
that a non-final judgment is not appealable, and "a judgment to 
be final, must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and 
finally dispose of the subject matter of the litigation on the 
merits of the case." Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc., 600 
P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). Further, the Court's subsequent 
dismissal of the contract claims could render any decision by 
this Court moot. See Respondent's Suggestion of Mootness and 
Motion to Dismiss, filed in this Court December 13, 1988. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant University Financial Concepts, Inc. (herein 
"UFCI") appeals from the decision of the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy granting Manulife's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Whether UFCI can support any cognizable claim for indemnity 
against Manulife upon the factual record. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third-Party. At any 
time after commencement of the action, a defendant, as 
a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and 
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to 
the action who is or may be liable to him for all or 
part of the plaintiff's claim against him. 
Rule 14, Utah R. Civ. P. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As indicated above, this is UFCI's appeal from the decision 
of the Honorable Michael R. Murphy granting Manulife summary 
judgment on UFCI's third-party claims against Manulife. The 
basis of Manulife1s motion in the court below was that given 
the undisputed material facts, UFCI could prove no set of facts 
by which Manulife would be liable to UFCI for all or part of 
the principal-plaintiffs claim against UFCI. 
The undisputed facts material to the decision below are as 
follows: 
1. On or about September 5, 1983, UFCI sold plaintiff's 
decedent, Fred J. Solomon (herein "Solomon"), a $500,000 whole-
life insurance policy underwritten by Manulife. (Berrett Depo. 
at pp. 51-52; Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, at 1f 4.) 
2. UFCI agreed with Solomon that if Solomon would pay an 
annual interest payment of $2,449.20 for three years, UFCI 
would pay the premiums to keep the policy in effect for a 
minimum of three years. (Berrett Depo. at p. 53; Appellant's 
Brief, Statement of Facts, at 1f 6.) 
3. Solomon paid the first annual interest payment and 
UFCI paid the first year's premium to Manulife. Thus, the 
policy was in force from approximately October of 1983 to 
October of 1984. (Berrett Depo. at pp. 58-60; Appellant's 
Brief, Statement of Facts, at 1f 7.) 
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4. Because of UFCI's financial difficulties, UFCI did not 
pay the second year premiums on a number of policies, including 
the Solomon policy, and those policies, including the Solomon 
policy, lapsed. (Berrett Depo. at pp. 71, 143; Appellant's 
Brief at pp. 13, 17 and 25, Statement of Facts, at 1f 8.) 
5. In order to conserve the life insurance policies 
placed with Manulife during 1983, Manulife agreed with UFCI to 
allow policies with cash value to remain in force under the 
terms of the extended term insurance provision of the contracts 
beginning with Manulife's receipt from UFCI of $50,000, and 
subject to certain conditions. (Berrett Depo. at p. 141; 
Smithen Depo. at pp 10-11; Appellant's Brief, Statement of 
Facts, at 1f 9. ) 
6. The written agreement between Manulife and UFCI pro-
vided in pertinent part: 
Manufacturers agrees to allow the Contracts to remain 
in force under the terms of the extended term insur-
ance provision of the Contracts beginning with Manufac-
turers' receipt from you of $50,000 ("the term pay-
ment") subject to the following conditions: 
• • . 
2. The extended term insurance coverage will 
only continue on a week-by-week basis as provided 
below. 
• • • 
5. Beginning no later than seven calendar days 
after Manufacturers receives the term payment, 
you will be required to pay $25,000 per week 
(weekly payment) to continue coverage under the 
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extended term insurance provision, and the weekly 
payments will continue until all the contracts 
have been fully reinstated. Each weekly payment 
must be received by Manufacturers at its 
Sacramento office no later than seven calendar 
days after the prior weekly payment has been 
received. 
9. Failure to meet any of the requirements in 
clauses 1 to 7 above will result in immediate 
termination of the extended term insurance cover-
age on all the contracts that have not otherwise 
been fully reinstated. Thereafter, any contract 
that has been fully reinstated or has any remain-
ing cash value will remain in force as per the 
terms of the Contracts. 
(Agreement, attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit B.) 
7. UFCI did not make weekly payments according the agree-
ment, quoted above; nor did UFCI make sufficient payments to 
cover the premiums due on all of the policies. Because of this 
failure a number of policies were never reinstated and the Fred 
J. Solomon policy was one of the policies which was never 
reinstated. (Berrett Depo. at pp. 69, 72, 74.) 
8. By the spring of 1985, UFCI had ceased altogether 
making payments to Manulife pursuant to the agreement, and 
Manulife received no money from UFCI after May of 1985. 
Accordingly, Manulife terminated the agreement. (Smithen Depo. 
p. 54; Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, at 1f1f 20-21.) 
9. If sufficient premium payments had been received by 
Manulife from UFCI, all of the policies would have been rein 
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stated, or none of the policies would liave lapsed. Manulife 
lost significant monies vhen policies w±±h a high initial cash 
value like those involved in UFCI's "premium financing" arrange-
ment lapsed in the first OT second year. (Smithen Depo. at pp. 
4-6.) 
10. Manulife sent to UFCI notices that the Solomon policy 
had lapsed in 1:he second year. UFCI received those notices and 
never received any notice of reinstatement from Manulife for 
Fred J. Solomon in any form. In fact, in November or December 
of 1985, some three months before Solomon's death, UFCI was 
"scrambling" to find coverage with another insurance company. 
(Berrett Depo. at p. 166; Christopherson Depo. at pp. 46-47.) 
11. On or about February 15, 1986, in what would have been 
the third year of the policy had the policy not lapsed, Fred J. 
Solomon died. (Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, at 1f 11.) 
12. Plaintiffs claim that at the time Mr. Solomon died, he 
should have been covered Jby the insurance policy according to 
his agreement with UFCI. Plaintiffs brought this action 
against UFCI alleging causes of action against UFCI for breach 
of its agreement to pay the required premiums to keep the 
policy with Manulife in force for three years from approxi-
mately October 5, 1983, and for negligence for UFCI's failure 
to pay the required premiums to keep the policy in force. 
(Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, at 1F1f 14-27.) 
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13. Plaintiffs never claimed that Manulife was at fault in 
allowing the policy to lapse for non-payment of premium. (See 
generally, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Manulife*s position has been and continues to be that UFCI 
has not and cannot assert a cognizable indemnity claim under 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because Manulife 
cannot be held liable to UFCI for all or part of plaintiffs' 
claim against UFCI. Essentially, plaintiffs' claims against 
UFCI are that UFCI negligently allowed the Manulife policy to 
lapse by its failure to pay premiums, and thereby breached its 
contracts with Solomon. However, there is no evidence that 
Manulife did anything to cause or contribute to UFCI's failure 
to pay premiums, either after the first year of the policy, or 
after the agreement between Manulife and UFCI whereby the 
policy could have been reinstated had UFCI made sufficient 
weekly payments. 
UFCI does not make any reasoned argument to the contrary. 
Particularly, UFCI does not and cannot argue that if Manulife 
would have administered the Manulife-UFCI agreement differently 
the policy would have been in force when Solomon died. Rather, 
UFCI argues at length that the agreement was ambiguous, and 
that if disputed issues of fact were resolved in its favor and 
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the agreement is construed a certain way, the Solomon policy 
was reinstated for its second year, and lapsed in its third 
year for non-payment of premiums. If the policy lapsed in its 
third year, according to UFCI's reasoning, then there is 
evidence that Solomon was contributorily negligent and himself 
failed to make required premium payments. 
Significantly, however, whether the policy lapsed because 
UFCI didn't pay premiums, or because Solomon himself didn't pay 
them, the non-payment does not somehow make Manulife liable to 
UFCI for plaintiffs claim against UFCI. An insurer's 
obligation to pay death benefits is premised upon payment of 
premiums. The fact is and remains that plaintiffs' claim is 
premised on UFCI's failure to make premium payments, and 
Manulife did nothing to contribute to that failure. 
ARGUMENT 
UFCI'S THIRD-PARTY INDEMNITY CLAIM AGAINST 
MANULIFE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE 
UFCI CAN PROVE NO SET OF FACTS BY WHICH 
MANULIFE IS OR MAY BE LIABLE TO UFCI FOR 
PRINCIPAL-PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM AGAINST UFCI. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) provides that a defend-
ing party may only serve a third-party complaint against a 
person not a party to the action "who is or may be liable to 
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a). 
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Stated another way, the above-cited Rule means that to 
state a valid claim under Rule 14, UFCI, as a third-party 
plaintiff, must be attempting to pass on to third-party 
defendant Manulife all or part of the liability asserted 
against UFCI. See J. Moore, 3 Moore's Federal Practice 1f 1407 
(2nd ed. 1988). 
In this case, plaintiffs' claims against UFCI are premised 
upon UFCI's failure to live up to its agreement to pay the 
premiums necessary to provide insurance coverage for Fred J. 
Solomon for a three-year period. It is undisputed that by the 
time Solomon died, the life insurance policy underwritten by 
Manulife had lapsed because of nonpayment of premiums. There 
is no evidence, however, that Manulife caused the failure to 
pay the required premiums. In fact, it is undisputed that 
Manulife made every effort to allow UFCI to make the premium 
payments, even to the extent of allowing UFCI to make premium 
payments late and carrying certain of the policies in force 
when no premium had been received. Under these circumstances, 
any liability Manulife might incur is entirely independent of 
the liability claimed against UFCI, and UFCI is not stating a 
valid third-party claim. 
UFCI's argument with regard to its indemnity claim against 
Manulife is difficult to follow at best. UFCI does not argue 
that if Manulife had administered the Manulife-UFCI agreement 
differently, the policy would have been in force when Solomon 
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died, and that Manulife's mishandling of the agreement caused 
plaintiffs' loss. Nor does UFCI argue that Manulife caused 
plaintiffs's loss by inappropriately terminating the Manulife-
UFCI agreement at all and thus caused plaintiff's loss. Such 
arguments are precluded by UFCI's position that the policy in 
fact lapsed in its third year and before Solomon's death 
because of Solomon's own failure to make interest payments. 
See Appellant's Brief, at pp. 13, 17 and 25. Where it is 
undisputed that no one, not UFCI, nor Solomon, made premium 
payments in the third year of the policy, and the agreement was 
terminated well before the second-year anniversary date of the 
Solomon policy, regardless of the agreement there would have 
been no coverage when Solomon died in 1986. 
Rather, in its Brief UFCI labors for some eight pages 
arguing the proposition that the Court below erred in holding 
the Solomon policy lapsed for non-payment of premiums in its 
second year. See Appellant's Brief, at pp. 17-25. According 
to UFCI, it was error to hold that the policy lapsed in its 
second year of existence, and thus UFCI goes on to state: 
The Manulife policy was in full force and effect 
during the second year of its existence. The policy 
actually lapsed in its third year due to Mr. Solomon's 
failure to make his third-year interest payment to 
UFCI. The premium on the Manulife policy, for the 
third-year, was due September 5, 1985. The grace 
period on the Manulife policy allowed the premium 
payment to be made as late as October 6, 1985. 
Mr. Solomon did not tender his third-year interest 
payment to UFCI until October 28, 1985, a full 
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twenty-two days after the policy had already elapsed. 
UFCI had no duty to tender a payment to Manulife 
absent Mr. Solomon's interest payment to UFCI, and 
therefore UFCI did not contribute to the lapse of this 
policy. 
Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, UFCI is taking the position that the policy did in 
fact lapse for non-payment of premiums, albeit in it's third 
year. However, whether the policy lapsed in its second year, 
because UFCI failed to make premium payments, as Judge Murphy 
held and as plaintiffs contend, or whether the policy lapsed in 
its third year, because of Mr. Solomon's failure to make the 
requisite premium/interest payment, as UFCI contends, Manulife 
is not made liable to UFCI for all or part of plaintiffs' claim 
against UFCI1. An insurer's obligation to pay death benefits 
is premised upon the payment of premiums. Larsen v. Wycoff 
Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981) ("An insurer has the right to 
cancel coverage when an employer discontinues payment for an 
•^Although it does not do so in its arguments before this Court, 
in the Court below UFCI made the strange statement that a jury 
could find that the policy lapsed in its second, rather than 
its third year. "That being the case, it is clear that Manulife 
is, or may be liable to UFCI for the claim made against UFCI by 
the heirs of Fred J. Solomon, if UFCI wrongfully terminated the 
. . . agreement." See UFCI's Memorandum in Opposition to Third-
Party Defendant Manulife's Motion for Summary Judgment, at pp. 
13-14. However, whether the policy lapsed in its second year, 
or its third year, the only difference is that if the policy 
lapsed in its third year UFCI can then assert a defense of 
contributory negligence. Not surprisingly UFCI cites no 
authority for the proposition that Manulife's action, even if 
proven, resulting in UFCI being precluded from asserting a 
legal defense gives UFCI a valid indemnity claim. 
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employee insured under a group life insurance policy, whether 
or not the employee contributes to the cost of the premiums." 
Citing Couch v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 216 
So.2d 72 (Fla. App. 1968)). 
In sum, UFCI's alleged liability arises because it did not 
make sufficient premium payments to keep the Solomon insurance 
policy in force. UFCI's indemnity claim is not an attempt to 
pass on this liability to Manulife because there is no evidence 
that Manulife was in any way responsible for UFCI's failure to 
pay premiums, or for plaintiffs' loss. Under these circum-
stances, UFCI's claim cannot properly be asserted against 
third-party defendant Manulife under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Manulife respectfully submits that 
Judge Murphy's decision granting Manulife summary judgment on 
UFCI's third-party indemnity claim must be upheld. Manulife is 
entitled to judgment, no cause of action, as a matter of law. 
DATED this day of December, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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